Interlocking Directorates as a Trust Substitute: The Case of the Italian Non-Life Insurance Industry

University of Teramo Department of Communication Working Paper No. 1-2006

24 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2013

See all articles by Davide Carbonai

Davide Carbonai

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) - Departamento de Ciências Administrativas

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo

Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law

Date Written: December 1, 2006

Abstract

This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies' market shares.

Keywords: Non-life insurance, antitrust, competition, interlocking directorates, network economics

JEL Classification: D40, G10, G20, K20, L40, L50

Suggested Citation

Carbonai, Davide and Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, Interlocking Directorates as a Trust Substitute: The Case of the Italian Non-Life Insurance Industry (December 1, 2006). University of Teramo Department of Communication Working Paper No. 1-2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=953648 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.953648

Davide Carbonai

Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) - Departamento de Ciências Administrativas ( email )

Rua Washington Luiz, 855
Porto Alegre, 90010-460
Brazil
55 51 3308-3536 (Phone)
55 51 3308-3991 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ufrgs.br/escoladeadministracao/

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law ( email )

via Castro del Laurenziano 9
Roma, 00191
Italy

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