The Impact of Contract Type on Broker Performance: Submarket Effects

Abstract

Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) develop and empirically test a model that analyzes the effect the type of listing contract, either exclusive agency (EA) or exclusive right to sell (ERTS), has on the performance of the agent/broker. This paper extends the work of Rutherford et al. and looks at differences between housing submarkets delineated by price. The results show a selling price discount associated with both broker-effected and owner-effected sales for lower-priced houses with EA contracts. For higher-priced houses, there is no price advantage to an EA listing if the broker achieves the sale, but if the owner sells the house, there is a modest price premium associated with the sale. The primary implication of the results is that owners of lower-priced houses should be wary of alternative listing arrangements, namely EA contracts.

Keywords: listing contract, exclusive agency, exclusive right

JEL Classification: H31, P36, L85, P46,R20,R21,R31,D10,D11,D12,D13,R11