A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard

9 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2006

See all articles by Andrea Attar

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Roma Tor Vergata

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg

Nicolas Porteiro

University Pablo de Olavide

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2006

Abstract

We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts.

Keywords: Menus, Common Agency

JEL Classification: D82

Suggested Citation

Attar, Andrea and Piaser, Gwenael and Porteiro, Nicolas, A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard (September 2006). University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 36/06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954083 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.954083

Andrea Attar (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics

21, allée de Brienne
Toulouse, F 31000
France
+33 5 61128578 (Phone)

University of Roma Tor Vergata ( email )

2 Via Columbia
00100 Rome
Italy

Gwenael Piaser

Universite du Luxembourg ( email )

148, avenue de la Faïencerie
Luxembourg, L-1511
Luxembourg
+ 352 46 66 44 6811 (Fax)

Nicolas Porteiro

University Pablo de Olavide ( email )

Ctra. Utrera, Km.1
Sevilla, Seville 41010
Spain

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
72
Abstract Views
652
rank
199,618
PlumX Metrics