Imposed Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution

43 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2006

See all articles by Alberto Chong

Alberto Chong

University of Ottawa

Mark Gradstein

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and arguing that the period under the communist rule can be viewed as an "experiment" in institutional imposition. We find, consistent with some earlier related work, that citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favour increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. Our conclusion is that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (that lasted for about fifty years) had a limited effect on preferences.

Keywords: Institutions, markets versus state, redistributional preferences

JEL Classification: D02, D30, I31, P30, P51

Suggested Citation

Chong, Alberto and Gradstein, Mark, Imposed Institutions and Preferences for Redistribution (November 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5922, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954156

Alberto Chong

University of Ottawa ( email )

2292 Edwin Crescent
Ottawa, Ontario K2C 1H7
Canada

Mark Gradstein (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+97 2 8647 2288 (Phone)
+97 2 8647 2941 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

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