An Inquiry into the Implications Rent Seeking and Ex Post Acceptance of Reforms Can Have for Higher Education

13 Pages Posted: 2 Jan 2007

See all articles by Theodore Pelagidis

Theodore Pelagidis

University of Piraeus; Brookings Institution

Michael S. Mitsopoulos

Hellenic Federation of Enterprises

Date Written: January 1, 2007

Abstract

Resistance to reform that reduces heavy government intervention in the management of higher education institutions is commonly observed specifically around Continental Europe. We offer a theoretical argument involving externalities, using a model that is similar to Chamley's (1999) interpretation of Kuran's (1989) model, to describe how such, rent seeking in nature, ex ante fierce resistance to reform in tertiary education is compatible with a widespread ex post adoption of the new situation, which follows as a result of the change in the externalities that are generated from either choice. The theoretical argument, which is compatible with the observed behavior, suggests that once reforms are implemented, many of those rent seekers that previously opposed reform will adapt their behavior to the new framework of incentives.

Keywords: Rent-seeking, Higher Education, Institutional Reforms, Externalities, Time Allocation, Nash Equilibrium, Voting

JEL Classification: I22, I28, K00

Suggested Citation

Pelagidis, Theodore and Mitsopoulos, Michael S., An Inquiry into the Implications Rent Seeking and Ex Post Acceptance of Reforms Can Have for Higher Education (January 1, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.954412

Theodore Pelagidis (Contact Author)

University of Piraeus ( email )

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Brookings Institution ( email )

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Michael S. Mitsopoulos

Hellenic Federation of Enterprises ( email )

Xenofontos str 5
Athens, 10557
Greece
2106722694 (Phone)

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