Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: The Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions

Review of Law and Economics, 2007

Posted: 3 Jan 2007

See all articles by Ehud Guttel

Ehud Guttel

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Barak Medina

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Harsh sanctions are conventionally assumed to primarily benefit vulnerable targets. Contrary to this perception, this article shows that augmented sanctions often serve the less vulnerable targets. While decreasing crime, harsher sanctions also induce the police to shift enforcement efforts from more to less vulnerable victims. When this shift is substantial, augmented sanctions exacerbate (rather than reduce) the risk to vulnerable victims. Based on this insight, this article suggests several normative implications concerning the efficacy of enhanced sanctions, the importance of victims' funds, and the connection between police operation and apprehension rates.

Keywords: Game Theory, distribution of crime, enhanced sanction, detection,

Suggested Citation

Guttel, Ehud and Medina, Barak, Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: The Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions. Review of Law and Economics, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954674

Ehud Guttel (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

Barak Medina

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law ( email )

Mount Scopus
Mount Scopus, IL 91905
Israel

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