Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets

24 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2007

See all articles by Paul A. Grout

Paul A. Grout

University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO)

Ian Jewitt

University of Oxford - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Silvia Sonderegger

University of Bristol - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2006

Abstract

This paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets. The model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms. We identify a number of forces which determine the success of reform. Focussing particularly on the rent recapture and relationship substitution effects, we highlight their impact on client welfare and quality of legal services in different types of market according to whether clients are transient or repeated users of the service.

Keywords: Governance, legal services

JEL Classification: D02, D78, D86

Suggested Citation

Grout, Paul A. and Jewitt, Ian D. and Sonderegger, Silvia, Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets (November 2006). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5959, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954754

Paul A. Grout (Contact Author)

University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO) ( email )

Mary Paley Building
12 Priory Road Department of Economics
Bristol BS8 1TN
United Kingdom

Ian D. Jewitt

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
+44 1865 278698 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Silvia Sonderegger

University of Bristol - Department of Economics ( email )

8 Woodland Road
Bristol BS8 ITN
United Kingdom

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