Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption

16 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2007

See all articles by Roger Myerson

Roger Myerson

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Abstract

The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single-winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.

Suggested Citation

Myerson, Roger B., Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 4, pp. 727-742, December 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954847 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x

Roger B. Myerson (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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