Lobbying Bureaucrats

26 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2007

See all articles by Morten Bennedsen

Morten Bennedsen

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School

Abstract

We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision-making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying.

Suggested Citation

Bennedsen, Morten and Feldmann, Sven E., Lobbying Bureaucrats. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 4, pp. 643-668, December 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954851 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00473.x

Morten Bennedsen (Contact Author)

INSEAD - Economics and Political Sciences ( email )

Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5, Bygn 26
Copenhagen, 1353
Denmark

Sven E. Feldmann

Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
+61 3 9349 8171 (Phone)
+61 3 9349 8144 (Fax)

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