Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters

47 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2007

See all articles by Daniel Shaviro

Daniel Shaviro

New York University School of Law

Date Written: January 2007


This paper, written for a European conference on tax and corporate governance, evaluates two aspects of the U.S. legal response to corporate tax shelters: the civil penalty rules and the disclosure rules. It argues that, while the disclosure rules do not impose undue burdens, their usefulness to the IRS is limited by the difficulty of steering between the twin dangers of under-disclosure (permitting taxpayers to conceal close cousins of reportable transactions) and over-disclosure (creating information overload for the IRS). Thus, expanded reporting requirements with respect to book-tax differences in income accounting are likely to prove more useful to the IRS.

With respect to penalties, the paper argues that the rules' main flaw is excessive reliance on taxpayer good faith, which induces shopping around for "penalty shield" opinions from tax lawyers. To address this problem and create a better set of incentives in the "audit lottery," the paper argues for no-fault civil penalties, with penalty insurance serving to address any concerns about the proportionality of sanctions imposed on risk-averse taxpayers who may have been acting in good faith.

Keywords: corporate tax shelters, taxpayer disclosure, civil penalties, tax compliance

JEL Classification: H20, H24, H25, H26

Suggested Citation

Shaviro, Daniel, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters (January 2007). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=955354 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.955354

Daniel Shaviro (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
Room 314-B
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6187 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)

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