Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages

52 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2007

See all articles by John T. Addison

John T. Addison

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia; Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Thomas Zwick

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics; Maastricht University - Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

This paper provides the first full examination of the effect of German works councils on wages using matched employer-employee data (specifically, the LIAB for 2001). We find that works councils are associated with higher earnings. The wage premium is around 11 percent (and is higher under collective bargaining). This result persists after taking account of worker and establishment heterogeneity and the endogeneity of works council presence. Next, using quantile regressions, we find that the works council premium is decreasing with the position of the worker in the wage distribution. And it is also higher for women than for men. Finally, the works council wage premium is associated with longer job tenure. This suggests that some of the premium is a noncompetitive rent, even if works council voice may dominate its distributive effects insofar as tenure is concerned.

Keywords: matched employer-employee data, rent seeking, tenure, wages, wage distribution, works councils

JEL Classification: J31, J50

Suggested Citation

Addison, John T. and Teixeira, Paulino and Zwick, Thomas and Zwick, Thomas, Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages (2006). ZEW - Center for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 06-086, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=955761 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.955761

John T. Addison

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

The Francis M. Hipp Building
1705 College Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-7400 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/economics/profiles/addison.htm

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia ( email )

Av. Dias da Silva, 165
Coimbra, 3004-512
Portugal

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

Thomas Zwick (Contact Author)

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

University of Würzburg - Business Administration & Economics ( email )

Sanderring 2
Wuerzburg, D-97070
Germany

Maastricht University - Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, MD6200
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
85
Abstract Views
1,056
Rank
321,401
PlumX Metrics