Approximate Equilibria for Bayesian Multi-Criteria Games

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2006-121

10 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2007

See all articles by Lina Mallozzi

Lina Mallozzi

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF)

Lucia Pusillo

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research; Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research; Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

In this paper the existence of Bayesian multi-criteria equilibria in mixed strategies is established for finite Bayesian multi-criteria games.Sufficient conditions are given under which approximate equilibria exist for non-finite Bayesian multi-criteria games.

Keywords: non-cooperative games, Bayesian multi-criteria equilibria

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Mallozzi, Lina and Pusillo, Lucia and Tijs, Stef H., Approximate Equilibria for Bayesian Multi-Criteria Games (December 2006). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2006-121, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=955796 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.955796

Lina Mallozzi (Contact Author)

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II - Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF) ( email )

Via Cintia
Complesso Monte S. Angelo
Naples, Naples 80126
Italy

Lucia Pusillo

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica ( email )

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

Stef H. Tijs

Tilburg University - Center For Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
B925
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2348 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Università degli Studi di Genova - Dipartimento di Matematica

Via Dodecaneso 35
16146 Genoa
Italy

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