Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information?

2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper

BuR Business Research Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 2008

19 Pages Posted: 20 Feb 2007

See all articles by Bjoern M. Dymke

Bjoern M. Dymke

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Andreas Walter

University of Giessen - Department of Financial Services

Date Written: July 13, 2007

Abstract

Our study focuses on the question whether corporate insiders in Germany exploit inside information while trading in their company's stock. In contrast to prior international studies, which are not able to link insider transactions to a formal definition of inside information, we relate insider transactions to subsequent releases of inside information via ad-hoc news disclosures. We find evidence that corporate insiders as a group seem to trade on inside information. Moreover, members of the supervisory board seem to be most active in exploiting inside information since they realize exceptionally high profits with their frequent front-running transactions.

Keywords: insider trading, inside information, §15a WpHG, German stock market, regulation of financial markets

JEL Classification: G11, G14, G15, G34, D82

Suggested Citation

Dymke, Bjoern M. and Walter, Andreas, Insider Trading in Germany - Do Corporate Insiders Exploit Inside Information? (July 13, 2007). 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, BuR Business Research Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956066

Bjoern M. Dymke

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany

Andreas Walter (Contact Author)

University of Giessen - Department of Financial Services ( email )

Betriebswirtschaftslehre V
Giessen, 35394
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uni-giessen.de/fbz/fb02/fb/professuren/bwl/walter

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