Terrorism Damage Exchange Rates: Quantifying Defender Disadvantage

https://ssrn.com/abstract=956403

Martin Shubik

Yale University - School of Management; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

University of Maryland Francis Carey School of Law

December 14, 2006

25 Defense and Security Analysis 7 (2009)

Abstract:

Sources of funding, cost of attack and defense, damage exchange rates and some myths of terrorist activities are considered.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: terrorism funding, damage exchange rate

Shubik, Martin and Zelinsky, Aaron, Terrorism Damage Exchange Rates: Quantifying Defender Disadvantage (December 14, 2006). 25 Defense and Security Analysis 7 (2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956403 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.956403

Martin Shubik (Contact Author) Yale University - School of Management ( email ) Box 208200 New Haven, CT 06520-8200 United States
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email ) Box 208281 New Haven, CT 06520-8281 United States 203-432-3694 (Phone) 203-432-6167 (Fax) HOME PAGE: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/au/d_shubik.htm
Aaron Zelinsky University of Maryland Francis Carey School of Law ( email ) 500 West Baltimore Street Baltimore, MD 21201-1786 United States

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