Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel

Economica, Forthcoming

Posted: 11 Jan 2007

See all articles by Christophe Depres

Christophe Depres

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) - CESAER

Gilles Grolleau

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA

Naoufel Mzoughi

INRA Ecodéveloppement

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Abstract

Based on a case of contracting for environmental property rights, we explore several implications of applying Coase's insights. The case study adds empirical content to transaction costs concepts by analyzing the design and implementation of a contractual arrangement between a pollutee - a bottler of mineral water, Vittel - and several polluting farmers. We analyze the bargaining to determine how transaction cost issues (valuation disputes, bilateral monopoly conditions, and third-party effects) were overcome and how the parties succeeded in contracting for environmental rights. We compare the Vittel case with similar cases (Katell-Roc, Auxerre, and Munich), to draw lessons for rights negotiations.

Keywords: contracting, property rights, transaction costs, Vittel, water

JEL Classification: K32, Q15, Q25

Suggested Citation

Depres, Christophe and Grolleau, Gilles and Mzoughi, Naoufel, Contracting for Environmental Property Rights: The Case of Vittel. Economica, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956574

Christophe Depres

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) - CESAER ( email )

26 Bd Dr Petitjean
Dijon Cedex, 21079
France

Gilles Grolleau

Montpellier SupAgro and Researcher at LAMETA ( email )

France

Naoufel Mzoughi (Contact Author)

INRA Ecodéveloppement ( email )

Domaine Saint-Paul - Site Agroparc
Avignon cedex 9, 84914
France

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