Cooperation by Evolutionary Feedback Selection in Public Good Experiments

24 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2007

See all articles by Didier Darcet

Didier Darcet

Insight Research LLC

Didier Sornette

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (D-MTEC); Swiss Finance Institute; Southern University of Science and Technology; Tokyo Institute of Technology

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

We suggest that the propensity for altruistic punishment and reward is an emergent property that has co-evolved with cooperation and has provided efficient feedback measured in social dilemma and public good experiments. A simple cost/benefit analysis at the level of single agents, who anticipate the action of her fellows and determine an optimal level of altruistic punishment, explains quantitatively experimental results on the third-party punishment game, the ultimatum game and altruistic punishment games. Numerical simulations of an evolutionary agent-based model of repeated agent interactions with feedback-by-punishments confirms that the propensity to punish is a robust emergent property.

Keywords: altruistic punishment, strong cooperativity, cooperation, public good games, social dilemma

JEL Classification: C71, H41, D63

Suggested Citation

Darcet, Didier and Sornette, Didier, Cooperation by Evolutionary Feedback Selection in Public Good Experiments (October 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.956599

Didier Darcet

Insight Research LLC ( email )

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Didier Sornette (Contact Author)

ETH Zürich - Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (D-MTEC) ( email )

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Swiss Finance Institute

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Southern University of Science and Technology

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Shenzhen, Guangdong 518055
China

Tokyo Institute of Technology

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Tokyo 152-8550, 52-8552
Japan

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