Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?

48 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2007

See all articles by Helge Berger

Helge Berger

Free University Berlin - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Volker Nitsch

Darmstadt University of Technology - Department of Law and Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Tonny Lybek

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department

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Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board's size. The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have larger boards.

Keywords: Central banks, Governance, Monetary policy

JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61

Suggested Citation

Berger, Helge and Nitsch, Volker and Lybek, Tonny, Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ? (December 2006). IMF Working Paper No. 06/281, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956744

Helge Berger (Contact Author)

Free University Berlin - Department of Economics ( email )

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Berlin 14195, 14195
Germany
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+49 30 838-52782 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/berger/eng_index.htm

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) ( email )

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany
+49 89 9224 1266 (Phone)
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HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Volker Nitsch

Darmstadt University of Technology - Department of Law and Economics ( email )

Marktplatz 15
Residenzschloss
Darmstadt, 64283
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tonny Lybek

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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