The Shortcomings of a Partial Release of Employment Protection Laws: The Case of the 2005 French Reform

42 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2007

See all articles by Pierre Cahuc

Pierre Cahuc

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE); Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA); University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Stéphane Carcillo

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); Sciences Po; IZA

Date Written: Janurary 2007

Abstract

This paper proposes an ex ante evaluation of the effects of new labor contracts such as the "Contrat Nouvelle Embauche" (CNE) introduced in France in 2005. The lessons we draw are of sufficiently general interest to be applicable to other countries or reforms of employment protection laws. Using a model that captures the characteristics of the French labor market, we simulate the effects of this reform on unemployment, employment, and welfare. We estimate that the CNE will lead to the creation of 70,000 additional jobs in the long run, but at the cost of a slight deterioration in welfare.

JEL Classification: J20, J41, J64, J65, J68

Suggested Citation

Cahuc, Pierre and Carcillo, Stephane, The Shortcomings of a Partial Release of Employment Protection Laws: The Case of the 2005 French Reform (Janurary 2007). IMF Working Paper No. 06/301. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=956765

Pierre Cahuc (Contact Author)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - National School for Statistical and Economic Administration (ENSAE) ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France
+33 1 4117 3717 (Phone)
+33 1 4117 3724 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/membres/cahuc/

University of Angers - French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)

106-112 Boulevard de l'Hopital
75647 Paris Cedex 13
France
+33 4 44 07 82 06 (Phone)
+33 4 44 07 82 02 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Stephane Carcillo

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

2 rue Andre Pascal
Paris Cedex 16, 75775
France

Sciences Po ( email )

28 rue des Saints peres
Paris, 75007
France

IZA ( email )

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
74
Abstract Views
565
rank
319,238
PlumX Metrics