Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel

34 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2007

See all articles by Annabelle Gawer

Annabelle Gawer

University of Surrey

Rebecca M. Henderson

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Abstract

This paper explores Intel's strategy with respect to complements. We find that, as the literature predicts, Intel's entry decisions are shaped by the belief that it does not have the capabilities to enter all possible markets, and thus that it must encourage widespread entry despite the fact that potential entrants (rationally) fear Intel's ability to "squeeze" them ex post. We explore the ways in which Intel addresses this issue, highlighting in particular the firm's use of organizational structure and processes as commitment mechanisms. Our results have implications for our understanding of the dynamics of competition in complements and of the role of organizational form in shaping competition.

Suggested Citation

Gawer, Annabelle and Henderson, Rebecca M., Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-34, Spring 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=957919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2007.00130.x

Annabelle Gawer (Contact Author)

University of Surrey ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 8DN
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.surrey.ac.uk/sbs/people/annabelle_gawer/

Rebecca M. Henderson

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

E52-543
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6618 (Phone)
617-253-2660 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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