The Value of Excess Cash and Corporate Governance: Evidence from U.S. Cross-listings
55 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2007 Last revised: 10 Jun 2009
Date Written: June 1, 2009
We examine whether and how a U.S. cross-listing mitigates the risk that insiders will turn their firm’s cash holdings into private benefits. We find strong evidence that the value investors attach to excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges and over the counter than for their domestic peers. Further, we show that this excess-cash premium stems not only from the strength of U.S. legal rules and disclosure requirements, but also from the greater informal monitoring pressure that accompanies a U.S. listing. Overall, since investors’ valuation of excess cash mirrors how they expect the cash to be used, our analysis shows that a U.S. listing constrains insiders’ inefficient allocation of corporate cash reserves significantly.
Keywords: International cross-listing, corporate governance, cash holdings, liquidity
JEL Classification: G15, G34, G31
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation