Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in Antidumping Investigations?: An Empirical Analysis

28 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2007

See all articles by Michael Moore

Michael Moore

George Washington University - Department of Economics

Alan K. Fox

U.S. International Trade Commission

Date Written: January 19, 2007

Abstract

Foreign firms face punitive antidumping duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC). For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US chose faced "facts available" margins for the 1995-2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who do not. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm's decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than simply a result of investigating authority bias against imports.

Keywords: antidumping, commercial policy, trade policy, facts available

JEL Classification: F1, F13

Suggested Citation

Moore, Michael O. and Fox, Alan K., Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in Antidumping Investigations?: An Empirical Analysis (January 19, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=958531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.958531

Michael O. Moore (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Alan K. Fox

U.S. International Trade Commission ( email )

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