Autonomy Freedom and Preferences for Redistribution

44 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2007

See all articles by Sebastiano Bavetta

Sebastiano Bavetta

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); University of Palermo

Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti

University of Essex; University of Messina

Ram Mudambi

Temple University - Department of Strategic Management

Pietro Navarra

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance; London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS

Date Written: January 23, 2007

Abstract

In this paper we study the determinants of people's attitudes toward income inequality and their consequences for redistributive policies. In the light of a recent literature in social choice theory, we argue that an individual's attitudes toward inequality depend upon the extent of autonomy freedom he/she enjoys. We use individual level data to validate our theory and show that the higher the extent of an individual's autonomy freedom, the greater the probability that he/she supports larger income differences as incentives for individual effort. Conversely, the lower the extent of autonomy freedom, the more likely he/she supports the view that incomes should be made more equal. These findings appear to be robust to different model specifications even after controlling for a large set of both socio-economic variables and individual characteristics.

Keywords: Freedom, Fairness, Social Mobility

JEL Classification: D31, D63, H23

Suggested Citation

Bavetta, Sebastiano and Maimone Ansaldo Patti, Dario and Mudambi, Ram and Navarra, Pietro, Autonomy Freedom and Preferences for Redistribution (January 23, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=958948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.958948

Sebastiano Bavetta

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

University of Palermo

I-98121 Palermo
Italy

Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti

University of Essex ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester, CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

University of Messina

Piazza Pugliatti, 1
Messina, Messina 981223
Italy
+39090719202 (Phone)
+39090719202 (Fax)

Ram Mudambi

Temple University - Department of Strategic Management ( email )

Fox School of Business and Management
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-2099 (Phone)
215-204-8029 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sbm.temple.edu/~rmudambi/index.html

Pietro Navarra (Contact Author)

University of Messina - Institute of Economics and Finance ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti 1
Messina
Sicilia, 98122
Italy
39-090-676-4446 (Phone)
39-090-292-0014 (Fax)

London School of Economics & Political Science - CPNSS ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
44-207-955-6820 (Phone)

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