Lawyers and Politicians: The Impact of Organized Legal Professions on Institutional Reforms

Posted: 24 Jan 2007

See all articles by Peter Grajzl

Peter Grajzl

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics; CESifo

Peter Murrell

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Organized legal professions often play a central role in successful institutional development. The paper's model examines how legal professions affect institutional reform. Professional review of reform proposals solves a politician's informational problem in a way that makes democracy, political stability, and professional power substitutes. The model's applicability is examined by showing that its predictions track the fortunes of lawyers in the USSR and early transition and are consistent with events in 1688 in England and 1789 in France, indicating why these two revolutions had different consequences. The model suggests why and when civil law and common law systems differ.

Keywords: organized legal profession, institutional reform, interest groups, civil and common law, Soviet Union, Glorious Revolution

JEL Classification: D72, D82, H10, K40, N40, P51

Suggested Citation

Grajzl, Peter and Murrell, Peter, Lawyers and Politicians: The Impact of Organized Legal Professions on Institutional Reforms. Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=959088

Peter Grajzl (Contact Author)

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lexington, VA 24450
United States

HOME PAGE: http://home.wlu.edu/~grajzlp/

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Peter Murrell

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3476 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

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