Review of Corporate Finance Studies Forthcoming
54 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2008 Last revised: 20 Jun 2016
Date Written: September 22, 2014
Formal finance involves costly information acquisition about distant entrepreneurs, while relationship-based finance allows financiers to fund a narrow circle of close entrepreneurs without engaging in costly information acquisition. We show that in developing economies with low capital endowments, relationship-based finance is optimal because only high-quality entrepreneurs receive funding. However, formal finance may emerge in equilibrium and has the only effect of shifting rents from entrepreneurs to financiers. In more developed economies with higher capital endowments, formal finance becomes necessary to prevent low-quality entrepreneurs from being funded. Nevertheless, relationship-based financing may persist in equilibrium and capital may be allocated to low-quality close entrepreneurs even when there are high-quality distant entrepreneurs.
Keywords: Finance and growth; Information acquisition; Competition for capital; Relationship-based vs.arm's length financial systems
JEL Classification: G3, O16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Giannetti, Mariassunta and Yu, Xiaoyun, Economic Development and Relationship-Based Financing (September 22, 2014). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 153/2007; Review of Corporate Finance Studies Forthcoming; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 153/2007; AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=959188 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.959188