Selected Economic Analysis at the Antitrust Division: The Year in Review
40 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Abstract
Of the many activities of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, we have summarized some which raise interesting economic issues. We describe recent improvements in the methodology to be used in Coordinated Effects analysis of mergers. We also discuss four cases brought by the DOJ that raise issues of market definition, the influence of common partial ownership of competitors, and the effects of fringe suppliers in constraining collusion by large firms.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry
-
Monopolization by 'Raising Rivals' Costs': The Standard Oil Case
By Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein
-
Vertical Restraints in the Bromine Cartel: The Role of Distributors in Facilitating Collusion
-
International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s
By Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C. Levenstein, ...
-
Autos and the National Industrial Recovery Act: Evidence on Industry Complementarities
By Russell Cooper and John Haltiwanger
-
The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, and Rules
By Robert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel