On the Licensing of Innovations Under Strategic Delegation
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 6, pp. 1-10, 2004
Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Abstract
This note uses a three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.
Keywords: licensing, strategic delegation
JEL Classification: L1, L2
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hsu, Yu-Pei Judy and Wang, Xinghe Henry, On the Licensing of Innovations Under Strategic Delegation. Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 6, pp. 1-10, 2004
, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=959617
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