51 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2007
Date Written: 2007
In the early 1900's American financial institutions were active participants in U.S. corporate governance but the enactment of securities laws in the 1930's limited the power of financial intermediaries and thus their governance role. The consequence of such laws and regulations was a progressive widening of the gap between ownership and control in large U.S. public companies. In 1942, SEC rule changes allowed shareholders to submit proposals for inclusion on corporate ballots. Since that time, shareholder activists have used the proxy process, and other approaches, to pressure corporate boards and managers for change. In particular, during the mid-1980s, the involvement of large institutional shareholders increased dramatically with the advent of public pension fund activism. At the heart of shareholder activism is the quest for value, yet the empirical evidence suggests that effects of such activism are mixed. We review the evidence on activism and, while some studies have found positive short-term market reactions to announcements of certain kinds of activism, there is little evidence of improvement in the long-term operating or stock-market performance of the targeted companies. A recent increase in hedge fund activism appears to be associated with dramatic corporate change, however, the research in this area is still somewhat nascent and the long-term effects are still unknown.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Shareholder Activism
JEL Classification: G30, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation