'Facts Available' Dumping Allegations': When Will Foreign Firms Cooperate in Antidumping Petitions?: A Theoretical Analysis

37 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2007

See all articles by Michael Moore

Michael Moore

George Washington University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Foreign firms accused of dumping in the WTO system may face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with domestic investigative authorities. These punitive tariffs are typically based on domestic firms' allegations - so-called "facts available" dumping margins. This paper analyzes a game between two Bertrand Nash competitors: a) domestic petitioner and b) a foreign respondent, as well as an administering authority. Foreign firm cooperation will depend on the interplay between compliance costs and the allegations of the domestic competitor. The final tariff and degree of cooperation will depend on the level of compliance costs chosen by the domestic authority.

Keywords: antidumping, commercial policy, trade policy, facts available

JEL Classification: F1, F13

Suggested Citation

Moore, Michael O., 'Facts Available' Dumping Allegations': When Will Foreign Firms Cooperate in Antidumping Petitions?: A Theoretical Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 21, No 1, pp. 185-204, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=959671

Michael O. Moore (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )

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