'Facts Available' Dumping Allegations': When Will Foreign Firms Cooperate in Antidumping Petitions?: A Theoretical Analysis
37 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2007
Abstract
Foreign firms accused of dumping in the WTO system may face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with domestic investigative authorities. These punitive tariffs are typically based on domestic firms' allegations - so-called "facts available" dumping margins. This paper analyzes a game between two Bertrand Nash competitors: a) domestic petitioner and b) a foreign respondent, as well as an administering authority. Foreign firm cooperation will depend on the interplay between compliance costs and the allegations of the domestic competitor. The final tariff and degree of cooperation will depend on the level of compliance costs chosen by the domestic authority.
Keywords: antidumping, commercial policy, trade policy, facts available
JEL Classification: F1, F13
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S Antidumping Activity
-
The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Activity in Historical Perspective
-
The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions
-
The Rise of U.S. Antidumping Actions in Historical Perspective
-
Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in Antidumping Investigations?: An Empirical Analysis
By Michael Moore and Alan K. Fox
-
Us 'Facts Available' Antidumping Decisions: An Empirical Analysis
-
Working the System: Firm Learning and the Antidumping Process