Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums

Abstract

Previous research (Rutherford et al., 2005; Levitt and Syverson, 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when sellling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price.

Keywords: agency theory, percentage commission contract, residential brokerage