Do Some People Work Harder than Others? Evidence from Real Estate Brokerage

Posted: 30 Jan 2007

See all articles by John D. Benjamin

John D. Benjamin

American University - Kogod School of Business

Peter T. Chinloy

American University - Department of Finance and Real Estate

G. Donald Jud

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Accounting and Finance

Daniel T. Winkler

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Accounting and Finance

Abstract

The decision to work and its levels of intensity are estimated for the real estate brokerage industry where workers can set their own hours. A three-stage model of the brokerage labor market is presented with decisions made recursively between full- and part-time status, wage offers and hours worked. The application is to data from a cross-sectional survey of 6,842 real estate licensees in the United States for 1999. Conditional on self-selection, an expected wage for real estate licensees is estimated given skills and personal characteristics. That expected wage enters the supply-side equation for the number of hours worked. The findings indicate the skills such as education, experience and licensee status are related to higher wages, but there is a negative self-selection in wages: part-time workers have higher unmeasured skills. Schooling and experience decreases hours worked, consistent with increasing efficiency. The resulting labor supply elasticity with respect to the wage is 0.24.

Keywords: agency, earnings, labor supply, part-time, real estate brokerage, race, work choice

Suggested Citation

Benjamin, John D. and Chinloy, Peter and Jud, G. Donald and Winkler, Daniel T., Do Some People Work Harder than Others? Evidence from Real Estate Brokerage. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=960112

John D. Benjamin

American University - Kogod School of Business ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Department of Finance
Washington, DC 20016
United States
(202) 885-1892 (Phone)
(202) 885-1946 (Fax)

Peter Chinloy (Contact Author)

American University - Department of Finance and Real Estate ( email )

Kogod School of Business
4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8044
United States
202-885-1951 (Phone)
202-885-1992 (Fax)

G. Donald Jud

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 26165
Greensboro, NC 27412
United States
336-334-3091 (Phone)
336-334-4141 (Fax)

Daniel T. Winkler

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Greensboro, NC 27412
United States
336-256-0122 (Phone)

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