Transaction Cost Economics in International Relations: The Case of International Antitrust Enforcement

81 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2007

See all articles by Martin Holterman

Martin Holterman

University of Twente - School of Management and Governance

Date Written: January 30, 2007

Abstract

The paper examines the viability of applying transaction cost reasoning to the government by discussing the possibility of further international cooperation in the field of antitrust. Given that, in their international relations, the analogy between states and private actors is more realistic than in states' domestic behavior, the hypothesis is that the model will do a better job of explaining state behavior than in past efforts.

Keywords: Transaction Costs, Antitrust, International Relations

JEL Classification: A12, B25, D23, D78, H11, H77, H73, K21

Suggested Citation

Holterman, Martin, Transaction Cost Economics in International Relations: The Case of International Antitrust Enforcement (January 30, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=960428 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.960428

Martin Holterman (Contact Author)

University of Twente - School of Management and Governance ( email )

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