Strategic Voting Over Strategic Proposals

52 Pages Posted: 5 Feb 2007

See all articles by Philip Bond

Philip Bond

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Hulya Eraslan

Rice University

Date Written: January 2007


Prior research on "strategic voting" has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad: it results in destruction of information, and hence makes voters worse off. We show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous, i.e., independent of the voting rule used. We depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote, and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off. Moreover, in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposing individual better off, even when he has diametrically opposing preferences. In this case, unanimity is the Pareto dominant voting rule. Voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal. The proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher.

Note: An updated version of this paper can be found at:

Keywords: Strategic voting, agenda setting, multilateral bargaining

JEL Classification: C7, D7, D8

Suggested Citation

Bond, Philip and Eraslan, Hulya, Strategic Voting Over Strategic Proposals (January 2007). Available at SSRN: or

Philip Bond (Contact Author)

University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )

Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States

Hulya Eraslan

Rice University ( email )

Department of Economics MS-22
Rice University P.O Box 1892
Houston, TX Texas 77251-1892
United States
7133483453 (Phone)


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