Political Careers Or Career Politicians? Second Version

28 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2007

See all articles by Andrea Mattozzi

Andrea Mattozzi

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers (i.e., there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector). In this paper, we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in an environment with a private sector and a political sector, where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability and political skills. Our analysis provides an explanation for the existence of career politicians and individuals with political careers, and their motivations. We also investigate the effects of monetary incentives and other features of the political-economic environment on the quality of politicians and their careers. We show that an increase in the salary a politician receives while in office decreases the average quality of individuals who become politicians, decreases turnover in office, and may either decrease or increase the average quality of career politicians.

Note: A previous version of this paper can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=870305

Keywords: politicians, parties, careers in politics

JEL Classification: D72, J44, J45

Suggested Citation

Mattozzi, Andrea and Merlo, Antonio M., Political Careers Or Career Politicians? Second Version (February 2007). PIER Working Paper No. 07-009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=961844 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.961844

Andrea Mattozzi

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Italy

Antonio M. Merlo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

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