Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

35 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2007 Last revised: 19 Oct 2014

See all articles by Erik Ansink

Erik Ansink

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics

Arjan Ruijs

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.

Keywords: Water Allocation, Stability, Climate Change, Game Theory

JEL Classification: C7, Q25

Suggested Citation

Ansink, Erik and Ruijs, Arjan, Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements (February 2007). FEEM Working Paper No. 16.2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=962389 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.962389

Erik Ansink (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Arjan Ruijs

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group ( email )

P.O. Box 8130
Wageningen, 6700 EW
Netherlands

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