Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version
45 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2007
Date Written: February 2007
In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and stability of coalition governments. We then apply our methodology to estimate the effects of governmental bicameralism. Our main findings are that eliminating bicameralism does not affect government durability, but does have a significant effect on the composition of governments leading to smaller oalitions. These results are due to an equilibrium replacement effect: removing bicameralism affects the relative durability of coalitions of different sizes which in turn induces changes in the coalitions that are chosen in equilibrium.
Note: A previous version of this paper can be downloaded at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=312149
Keywords: Political Stability, Government Formation, Government Dissolution, Bicameralism, Comparative Constitutional Design
JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation