The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability

37 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2007


From an economic perspective, conventional fiduciary liability for self-dealing appears to raise little controversy. The accepted function of the duty of loyalty is to control opportunism in limited access arrangements. That legal duty is complemented by a variety of economic mechanisms that indirectly or incidentally perform the same function. Unfortunately, the conventional function is partially obscured by a number of conceptual confusions in the economic and legal literature. A review of the literature exposes the analytical misdirection and confirms the utility of the conventional proscription on self-interest.

Keywords: Delaware, Journal, Corporate, Law, Economics, Fiduciary, Accountability, Liability

Suggested Citation

Flannigan, Robert, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), No. 32, No. 2, 2007. Available at SSRN:

Robert Flannigan (Contact Author)

University of Saskatchewan ( email )

15 Campus Drive
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A6
306-966-5876 (Phone)
306-966-5900 (Fax)

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