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The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability

Robert Flannigan

University of Saskatchewan

Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), No. 32, No. 2, 2007

From an economic perspective, conventional fiduciary liability for self-dealing appears to raise little controversy. The accepted function of the duty of loyalty is to control opportunism in limited access arrangements. That legal duty is complemented by a variety of economic mechanisms that indirectly or incidentally perform the same function. Unfortunately, the conventional function is partially obscured by a number of conceptual confusions in the economic and legal literature. A review of the literature exposes the analytical misdirection and confirms the utility of the conventional proscription on self-interest.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Delaware, Journal, Corporate, Law, Economics, Fiduciary, Accountability, Liability

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Date posted: February 15, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Flannigan, Robert, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), No. 32, No. 2, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=962760

Contact Information

Robert Flannigan (Contact Author)
University of Saskatchewan ( email )
15 Campus Drive
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A6
306-966-5876 (Phone)
306-966-5900 (Fax)
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