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Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and Creditor Protection

European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 7, 2006

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE, Horst Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön, eds., pp. 421-457, 2008

Posted: 19 Feb 2007 Last revised: 2 Jun 2008

Luca Enriques

University of Oxford Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Martin Gelter

Fordham University School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

The European framework for creditor protection has undergone a remarkable transformation in recent years. While the ECJ's Centros case and its progeny have introduced free choice with respect to the State of incorporation, and hence the substantive company law regime, the European Insolvency Regulation has implemented uniform conflict of laws rules for insolvencies. However, this regime has opened up some forum shopping opportunities. This article analyzes possible consequences of regulatory competition and forum shopping for creditors and argues that the "insolvencification" of corporate law creditor protection mechanisms will not enable national policymakers to impose their respective ideas about creditor protection on firms in a fully-fledged manner.

Keywords: regulatory competition, creditor protection, EC company law, European Insolvency Regulation, forum shopping

JEL Classification: K20

Suggested Citation

Enriques, Luca and Gelter, Martin, Regulatory Competition in European Company Law and Creditor Protection. European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), Vol. 7, 2006 ; THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE, Horst Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön, eds., pp. 421-457, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=963347

Luca Enriques (Contact Author)

University of Oxford Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Road
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org

Martin Gelter

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

150 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
646-312-8752 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fordham.edu/info/23135/martin_gelter

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Brussels, B-1050
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=621

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