A Framework for Administering the 1916 Antidumping Act: Lessons from Antitrust Economics

29 Pages Posted: 23 Feb 2007

Abstract

The 1916 Antidumping Act is an ambiguous statute with virtually no legislative history. This article analyzes the Act from an economic perspective, arguing that Congress probably intended not to shield American industries from foreign competition by proscribing international price discrimination, but to protect American consumer by proscribing only international predatory pricing. Yet the social costs of any such attempt to protect consumers are likely to exceed the social benefits. Congress should, the article concludes, repeal the Act. As a second-best alternative, courts should adopt an approach that would reduce the probability that litigation under the Act will impair consumer welfare.

Suggested Citation

Sidak, J. Gregory, A Framework for Administering the 1916 Antidumping Act: Lessons from Antitrust Economics. Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 377-404, Summer 1982. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=964718

J. Gregory Sidak (Contact Author)

Criterion Economics, L.L.C. ( email )

1717 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
United States
(202) 518-5121 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.criterioneconomics.com

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