Does Gender Matter in Executive Compensation? a Case of High Tech Firms from Nasdaq.

29 Pages Posted: 25 Feb 2007

See all articles by Walayet A. Khan

Walayet A. Khan

University of Evansville

João Paulo Vieito

Scholl of Business Studies - Polytechnic Instituto of Viana do Castelo

Date Written: 15/12/2006

Abstract

We examine various gender base issues surrounding executives' compensation of high tech firms listed on NASDAQ from 1992 through 2005. Our results reveal many gender base differences during the sample period. To begin with, women represent only 4.03% of total number of executives in 1992 and this number increase to only 5.57 % in 2005. The total compensation in terms of salary, bonus and stock options, from 1992 to 2003, was on average much lower for women than for man, but this mean average is not statistically significant. After the year 2003 the difference in compensation between both sexes is negligible and also no statistically significant. More women opt for stock options than men. Furthermore, women, after 2003, are ahead of men in receiving a higher quantity of options. We also find that the gap of compensation by gender was bigger during the period of 1997 to 2000. We also find evidences that the variables that explain the women compensation are by and large the same as for the man but the coefficients are generally different and this difference is statically significant. Essentially our results show that a group of variables like firm size, the executive stock ownership, the number of unexercised options, the closing price of the company's stock price for the calendar year, and stock return volatility are common factors that explain the variation in total compensation for both men and women.

Keywords: executive compensation; gender; Nasdaq; risk aversion

JEL Classification: G38

Suggested Citation

Khan, Walayet A. and Vieito, João Paulo, Does Gender Matter in Executive Compensation? a Case of High Tech Firms from Nasdaq. (15/12/2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=964904 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.964904

Walayet A. Khan

University of Evansville ( email )

School of Business Admin 1800 Lincoln Avenue
Evansville, IN 47722
United States
812-479-2869 (Phone)
812-479-2872 (Fax)

João Paulo Vieito (Contact Author)

Scholl of Business Studies - Polytechnic Instituto of Viana do Castelo ( email )

Avenida Miguel Dantas
Valença, 4930
Portugal

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