A Family Member or Professional Management? The Choice of a CEO and its Impact on Performance

46 Pages Posted: 26 Feb 2007

See all articles by Shu-Hsing Li

Shu-Hsing Li

National Taiwan University

Shing-yang Hu

National Taiwan University - Department of Finance

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

In this study, we explore what kinds of firms are more likely to have a family CEO or professional CEO, and investigate the performance of CEOs from different backgrounds. The results show that firms with low requirements in managerial skills and a high potential for expropriation are more likely to choose a CEO from the largest shareholder's family (nepotism). As for the relationship between CEO background and firm performance, it depends on firm operating characteristics and control environment. When a firm requires high managerial skill, firm performance will be improved if the CEO is a professional manager and the largest shareholder has low cash-flow rights and weaker control. When there is large opportunity for expropriation in a firm, a firm's performance will be better if the CEO is a family member and the largest shareholder has highly persuasive cash-flow rights.

Keywords: Family CEOs, professional CEOs, firm characteristics, the largest shareholder, performance

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Li, Shu-Hsing and Hu, Shing-yang, A Family Member or Professional Management? The Choice of a CEO and its Impact on Performance (December 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=965563 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.965563

Shu-Hsing Li

National Taiwan University ( email )

50 Lane 144, Section 4
Taipei 32026
Taiwan
886 2 3366 1117 (Phone)

Shing-yang Hu (Contact Author)

National Taiwan University - Department of Finance ( email )

Room 715, School of Management
85, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Rd.
Taipei
Taiwan
+886 2 33661085 (Phone)
+886 2 23661299 (Fax)

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