Market Structure and Market Access

35 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 1, 2008

Abstract

We examine the interaction between goods trade and market power in domestic trade and distribution sectors. Theory suggests a set of linkages between service-sector competition and goods trade supported by econometrics involving imports of 22 OECD countries vis-à-vis 69 exporters. Competition in services affects the volume of goods trade while the market structure of the domestic service sector becomes increasingly important as tariffs are reduced. Empirically, lack of service competition apparently matters most for exporters in smaller, poorer countries. By ignoring the structure of the domestic services sector, we may be seriously overestimating the market-access benefits of tariff reductions.

Keywords: Markets and Market Access, Economic Theory & Research, Free Trade, Access to Markets, Trade Policy, Import Volumes, Distribution Section, Trade Liberalisation, GATS, Gravity Model

JEL Classification: F12, F13, L8, L16

Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Wooton, Ian, Market Structure and Market Access (March 1, 2008). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4151; CESifo Working Paper Series, No. 2239. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=965604

Joseph F Francois (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW) ( email )

Oppolzergasse 6
A-1010 Vienna
Austria

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 5540 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics ( email )

Sir William Duncan Building
130 Rottenrow
Glasgow G4 0GE
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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