The Effect of Stock Price on Discretionary Disclosure

Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming

53 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2007 Last revised: 19 Jul 2011

Date Written: July 18, 2011


I examine the impact of exogenous changes in stock prices on voluntary disclosure. Specifically, I investigate whether stock price declines prompt managers to voluntarily disclose firm-value-related information (management forecasts) that was withheld prior to the decline because it was unfavorable but became favorable at a lower stock price. Consistent with my predictions, I find that managers are more likely to release good-news forecasts following larger stock price declines but that there is no association between the likelihood of releasing good-news forecasts and the magnitude of stock price increases. Additional evidence indicates that the good-news forecasts eventually conveyed by withholding firms after negative price shocks would likely have resulted in negative market reactions had they been released before the shocks. More generally, I provide evidence that managers withhold bad news and that exogenous stock price declines can induce its disclosure.

Keywords: voluntary disclosure, management forecast, stock-price contagion, restatements, litigation risk

JEL Classification: M41, G14, G39

Suggested Citation

Sletten, Ewa, The Effect of Stock Price on Discretionary Disclosure (July 18, 2011). Review of Accounting Studies, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN:

Ewa Sletten (Contact Author)

The Ohio State University ( email )

Fisher Hall
2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210
United States
6142922451 (Phone)

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