Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting

63 Pages Posted: 2 Mar 2007 Last revised: 13 Mar 2013

Date Written: April 26, 2012

Abstract

This study argues that developed capital markets, through their monitoring and disciplining role, can significantly influence innovation and economic growth. Specifically, it examines how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation. It uses a panel of 13,339 firms over the 1976-2000 period, patents and patent citations to measure the quantity and quality of innovation, and the enactment of state antitakeover laws as an exogenous decrease in the threat of hostile takeovers. It finds a decline in innovation for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs two or more years after they are enacted, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, financial leverage, and product market competition.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Takeovers, Innovation, Financial Constraints, Managerial Myopia

JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Atanassov, Julian, Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation? Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting (April 26, 2012). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming; AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper; WFA 2008 Hawaii Meetings Paper; EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967421

Julian Atanassov (Contact Author)

University of Nebraska ( email )

CBA
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Lincoln, NE 68588
United States

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