Economics of Pupillage

Posted: 3 Mar 2007 Last revised: 26 Jan 2011

Rupert Macey-Dare

University of Oxford - Saint Cross College; Middle Temple; Minerva Chambers

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

This paper explores the economics of pupillage and shows why the imposition of minimum pupillage funding significantly reduces the annual supply of pupillages and skews the choice of pupils chosen towards more privileged candidates. The paper estimates the likely knock-on effects of minimum pupillage funding, in terms of reduced population of practicing barristers, increased barristers' fees and reduced public welfare.

Keywords: barrister, pupillage, legal training, professional vocational training, price-fixing, social welfare costs, protectionism, discrimination, anti-competitive

JEL Classification: D18, D43, D45, J44, K21

Suggested Citation

Macey-Dare, Rupert, Economics of Pupillage (2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967619 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967619

Rupert Macey-Dare (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Saint Cross College ( email )

Saint Giles
Oxford
United Kingdom

Middle Temple

Middle Temple Lane
London, EC4Y 9AT
United Kingdom

Minerva Chambers

London
United Kingdom

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