Why Do Japanese Firms Prefer Multiple Bank Relationship? Some Evidence from Firm-Level Data

Posted: 7 Mar 2007

See all articles by Kazuo Ogawa

Kazuo Ogawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Elmer Sterken

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Ichiro Tokutsu

Konan University

Abstract

We explore the determinants of the number of long-term bank relations of listed Japanese firms using a unique data set covering the sample period of 1982-1999. Japanese listed firms have about seven long-term bank loan relations on average, but show a large variation around the mean. We use data on loan and equity ownership to address the impact of the Japan-specific bank-firm relations and bank control on the number of loans decision. We find that having a relation with a top-equity holding bank reduces the number of bank relations, while debt-rich and cash-poor firms have more bank relations.

Keywords: Firm-bank relations, Single versus multiple borrowing, Bank control, Discrete choice model

JEL Classification: G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Ogawa, Kazuo and Sterken, Elmer and Tokutsu, Ichiro, Why Do Japanese Firms Prefer Multiple Bank Relationship? Some Evidence from Firm-Level Data. Economic Systems, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967694

Kazuo Ogawa

Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ( email )

6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
+81 6 6879 8570 (Phone)

Elmer Sterken (Contact Author)

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

Postbus 72
9700 AB Groningen
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Ichiro Tokutsu

Konan University ( email )

8-9-1 Okamoto Higashinadaku
Kobe 658-8501
Japan

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
752
PlumX Metrics