Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper #09-28
39 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2007 Last revised: 18 Oct 2014
Date Written: September 16, 2009
In countries such as Germany, the legal system ensures that firms are stakeholder oriented. In others, like Japan, social norms achieve a similar effect. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to shareholder-oriented firms in a model of imperfect competition. Stakeholder firms are more (less) valuable than shareholder firms when marginal cost uncertainty is greater (less) than demand uncertainty. With globalization shareholder firms and stakeholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms, and compare these mixed equilibria with the pure equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms only. The results have interesting implications for the political economy of foreign entry.
Keywords: Firm objective, co-determination, imperfect competition
JEL Classification: G34, G38, L11
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Allen, Franklin and Carletti, Elena and Marquez, Robert, Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (September 16, 2009). EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 190/2007; Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper #09-28. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=968141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968141