A Theory of Preemptive Entrenchment

EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper

59 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2007  

Dalida Kadyrzhanova

Georgia State University

Date Written: January 2007

Abstract

Entrenchment can benefit shareholders since aggressive managers deter rivals and, thus, make competition softer in the product market. I formalize this intuition within a simple industry equilibrium model of optimal entrenchment and test its implications empirically. The key cross-sectional prediction of the model is that industry leaders benefit most from preemptive entrenchment, since they suffer relatively larger losses in market share from facing tougher competition. I find strong support for this prediction and a number of related cross-sectional implications of my model using a large sample of U.S. public firms between 1990 and 2005 and a wide variety of entrenchment measures, such as external (antitakeover provisions, state antitakeover laws) and internal (board size and independence, institutional shareholders and pension funds) governance. In particular, I find that (i) industry leaders are more entrenched than laggards; (ii) the valuation effect of entrenchment is negative for laggards, but positive for leaders. Moreover, the link between industry leadership and the valuation effect of entrenchment is more pronounced in industries that are more concentrated, relatively less heterogeneous, and less subject to foreign competition. These findings offer a novel perspective over the debate on whether governance creates value by documenting when that is actually the case.

Keywords: Entrenchment, Corporate Governance and Firm Value, Industry Dynamics

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34

Suggested Citation

Kadyrzhanova, Dalida, A Theory of Preemptive Entrenchment (January 2007). EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=968260 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968260

Dalida Kadyrzhanova (Contact Author)

Georgia State University ( email )

J Mack Robinson College of Business
35 Broad St, 12th Floor
Atlanta, GA 30303-3083
United States

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