Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive EU Cartel Policy

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2007

26 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2007

See all articles by Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods; ABC economics

Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick

E.CA Economics; ESMT European School of Management and Technology

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Abstract

The implementation of leniency programs is considered a success both at EU Community level and in individual member states. The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations for cartel detection in light of leniency and complaint based cases. Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competition authority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on the prosecution of leniency or complaint based cases or follow a pro-active market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigations triggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcement tool to the other passive instruments available to a competition authority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspections based on economic criteria is presented allowing for a more pro active cartel policy.

Suggested Citation

Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. and Friederiszick, Hans Wolfgang, Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive EU Cartel Policy. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=969297

Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Contact Author)

IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS), Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods ( email )

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Hans Wolfgang Friederiszick

E.CA Economics ( email )

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Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.e-ca.com/our-team/#hans-w-friederiszick

ESMT European School of Management and Technology ( email )

Schlossplatz 1
Berlin, 10178
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://faculty-research.esmt.berlin/person/hans-w-friederiszick/bio

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