Economics of Deferral of Call

Posted: 21 Mar 2007 Last revised: 26 Apr 2008

See all articles by Rupert Macey-Dare

Rupert Macey-Dare

University of Oxford - Saint Cross College; Middle Temple; Minerva Chambers

Date Written: Spring 2007


This paper uses economic analysis to identify likely winners and losers and to consider how the structure of education and training for the Bar of England and Wales would change, if proposals for deferral of Call to the Bar until after the end of pupillage were ever implemented.

Keywords: barrister, pupillage, deferral of call, Inns of Court, legal education, professional vocational training, BVC, discrimination, protectionism, anti-competitive

JEL Classification: D18, D43, D45, J44, K21

Suggested Citation

Macey-Dare, Rupert, Economics of Deferral of Call (Spring 2007). Available at SSRN: or

Rupert Macey-Dare (Contact Author)

University of Oxford - Saint Cross College ( email )

Saint Giles
United Kingdom

Middle Temple

Middle Temple Lane
London, EC4Y 9AT
United Kingdom

Minerva Chambers

United Kingdom

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