59 Pages Posted: 13 Mar 2007
Date Written: March 2007
We model an economy in which domestic banks and firms face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Firms borrow from banks and uninformed investors, and can collude with banks to reduce the intensity of monitoring. We study the general equilibrium effects of capital flows (portfolio investments and loans, FDI) on the governance of domestic banks. We find that liberalization of capital flows may deteriorate the governance of the domestic financial system by increasing firms' incentives to collude with banks, with negative effects on productivity. We also show that systemic bailout guarantees increase the risks of collusion.
Keywords: Globalization, Governance, Banking
JEL Classification: F3, F43, G21, O16, O42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Tressel, Thierry and Verdier, Thierry, Financial Globalization and the Governance of Domestic Financial Intermediaries (March 2007). IMF Working Papers, Vol. , pp. 1-57, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=969861